Is There a Measure on Earth?: Sacred Possibilities for the Secular Discourse on Human Rights by Holkeboer, Mieke
BYU Law Review
Volume 2000 | Issue 3 Article 8
9-1-2000
Is There a Measure on Earth?: Sacred Possibilities
for the Secular Discourse on Human Rights
Mieke Holkeboer
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mieke Holkeboer, Is There a Measure on Earth?: Sacred Possibilities for the Secular Discourse on Human Rights, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 867
(2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2000/iss3/8
HOL-FIN.DOC 9/25/00 9:42 PM 
 
867 
Is There a Measure on Earth?: Sacred Possibilities for 
the Secular Discourse on Human Rights 
Mieke Holkeboer∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article entitled Human Rights: The Midlife Crisis, Mi-
chael Ignatieff declares provocatively that “[h]uman rights has be-
come the major article of faith of a secular culture that fears it be-
lieves in nothing else.”1 In a less pessimistic vein, University of 
Chicago theologian David Tracy has spoken similarly of the quasi-
religious dimension of contemporary human rights talk: “In one 
sense,” Tracy explains, “a concern with human rights is becoming 
something like an international civil religion.”2 For Tracy, however, 
this civil religion is not the faith of a fearful, agnostic culture but a 
reality with a positive role to play. Indeed, he warns of its fragility: 
“[I]f that reality is not to dissipate before the conflict of ideologies 
that surround and permeate it, some reasons must be forthcoming to 
affirm its grounds.”3 
Our question relates to the tension that lies between these two 
views. What is the relationship between religion and human rights? 
Or, more descriptive of the complexity we now enter, what are the 
relationships—practical, historical, and conceptual—between religion 
and human rights that shape the articulation and promotion of hu-
man rights today? Does human rights discourse need religion? If yes, 
what would this mean? Would religion include nontheistic faiths? Al-
ternatively, is it possible that the real tension at the heart of contem-
porary human rights discourse is not about religion at all but about 
morality? Might David Bromwich’s words about contemporary soci-
ety aptly speak to our present questions and crisis? “[T]he deeper 
 
 ∗ Research Associate, DePaul College of Law Center for Church-State Studies. 
 1. Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights: The Midlife Crisis, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 20, 
1999, at 58. 
 2. David Tracy, Religion and Human Rights in the Public Realm, DAEDALUS, Fall 
1983, at 237, 247. 
 3. Id. 
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conflict today may not be between those who adhere to a religious 
doctrine and those who do not, but between those who believe some 
moral goods are not negotiable and those who wonder what that 
could mean.”4 
Whether religion5 or morality is more deeply rooted, our Gor-
dian knot lies in the pervasive political clashes that arise among par-
ticular claims to universality and nonnegotiable ways of being hu-
man. Still, what makes the religion button especially hot, in part, is 
that freedom of religion and not freedom of morality is protected as 
a universal human right. Thus, it can conceivably outweigh or 
“trump” other legal considerations in a manner that claims to a free-
dom of morality, of course, could not. Whatever practical difficulties 
we encounter, we, at least those of us who want to retain the critical 
ability to judge human behavior, assume morality is in some sense 
universal; we cannot assume that religion is universal in this same 
general sense.6 
For relativists and nonrelativists alike, morality is a matter for 
cross-cultural reasoning and discussion. Indeed, for many, a discus-
sion about morality is the needed dialogical foundation for any kind 
of “rights” talk.7 A critical, cross-cultural discussion of religion, how-
ever, or religiously-based policies and practices, is far more problem-
atic, in part for a lack of common vocabulary and history and in part 
because what is deemed nonnegotiable in religion is too often rele-
gated, by insiders and outsiders, to the nonrational or irrational and 
 
 4. David Bromwich, Dover Beached, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 1999, at 29, 32-33. 
 5. “Religion” in this human rights context is delimited as in the inclusive sense codified 
in the International Bill of Rights. 
 6. Christian ethicist Lisa Sowle Cahill sharpens this practical point about the need for 
nonrelativist affirmations: 
[A]t the level of experientially recognized and practically important needs, social 
ethics proceeds on the assumption of a shared humanity and at least a fundamentally 
shared moral vision, whether or not the philosophical warrants for that assumption 
are clearly in place. Without some essential unity of human moral experience and 
common recognition of values, virtues, and vices, social criticism in the name of justice 
would be impossible. 
 LISA SOWLE CAHIL, SEX, GENDER, & CHRISTIAN ETHICS 33 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 7. Judith Jarvis Thomson draws such a moral map: 
[T]he concept of a right is only one among many moral concepts, and understand-
ing what it is to have a right requires us to get a sense of how that concept is related 
to the others . . . . We might think of morality as a continent and of rights as a terri-
tory or realm somewhere in it; understanding what is within the realm of rights re-
quires getting a sense of where in the continent it lies. 
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 3 (1990). 
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to the ahistorical or strictly transcendent. Too often a tradition’s own 
evolving logic and multivalent history are efficiently homogenized 
and offered as a kind of predetermined capsule, like the over-
packaged “Asian values,” rather than as an organic whole open to 
and the product of dialogue.8 
Ethicists and philosophers join the discussion with their queries 
about whether human rights can be framed and promoted apart 
from the underlying questions and vastly varying answers concerning 
human being, morality, and the good. If human rights is indeed a 
kind of international civil religion, is this glue enough to get us the 
necessary international consensus on matters of human dignity? 
Theologians, in turn, have wondered (and disagreed!) about our 
human capacity to acknowledge the religious or transcendent dimen-
sion of human being cross-culturally, to locate the proverbial ele-
phant, in other words, of which each culture grasps a part. At the 
heart of many theologians’ queries lies a practical question: how can 
theology, theism, and inter-religious dialogue lay a road for religious 
tolerance and human rights promotion? 
Finally, legal scholars and practitioners, with their own vocabu-
lary and framework, join the ethicists, theologians, philosophers, and 
others in the babble of contemporary human rights discourse to ar-
ticulate the crisis as they experience it. They pose questions of nor-
mativity with urgency in light of increasing conflicts between reli-
gious or belief-related human rights9 and other universal human 
rights. Are belief-related human rights more fundamental than any 
other? Can, for example, religious freedom claims ever trump vio-
lated rights of women or permit racial discrimination? How, in such 
circumstances, do we choose the pyrrhic victor without placing one 
culture’s values above another’s, without determining what is and is 
not legitimate religion? 
How, in addition, can international human rights treaties effec-
tively address the disconnect between the promises of their state par-
 
 8. See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values: What Lee Kuan Yew and Li Peng 
Don’t Understand About Asia, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14 & 21, 1997, at 33. 
 9. I have used the term “belief-related rights” to include the rights of agnostic, atheis-
tic, and nonbelieving persons. Acknowledging the incompleteness of each term singly, in this 
paper “religious human rights” and “belief-related human rights” will be used interchangeably. 
For a discussion of the conceptual difficulties attending the exclusive use of the term “religious 
human rights,” see David Little, Studying “Religious Human Rights”: Methodological Founda-
tions, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 49 
(John D. van der Vyer & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). 
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ties (those at the table) and the customs and beliefs of communities 
within the states that have made no such promises (those not at the 
table), often minority communities whose practices the states them-
selves are hesitant to judge (here, the tension between minority 
rights and human rights)? To what forum can we finally appeal to 
render a universally normative ordering of conflicting rights? 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS: A 
PESSIMIST’S SECULARITY OR SACRED POSSIBILITIES? 
It is not surprising, in light of what is at stake, that part of the 
human rights debate has been focused on whether international 
documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) and the United Nations Charter have a religious or 
secular foundation. For Ignatieff the secularity of the international 
human rights documents—and particularly of the seminal UDHR 
(1948)—provides a veneer of concord beneath which the friction of 
discordant values builds. Thus, despite over fourteen hundred 
rounds of voting on practically every word and clause of the Declara-
tion of Human Rights, and its subsequent adoption by forty-eight 
countries as diverse as Lebanon, Chile, France, China, and Ukraine, 
what lurk in the interstices of the UDHR’s original language for Ig-
natieff are “silences . . . that need to be confronted”: 
The “mid-life crisis” of human rights is not just about the discrep-
ancy between what states say and do. There is also a philosophical 
crisis: a sense that the silences in the Universal Declaration need to 
be confronted. The secularism of [the UDHR’s] premises is ever 
more open to doubt in a world of resurgent religious conviction.10 
Ignatieff’s assertions raise at least two questions here. First, was 
the UDHR merely the thin political compromise that he assumes? Is 
it, in other words, silences we must confront, or can we imagine the 
Declaration’s drafting rather as a rigorous battle of practical reason 
where what remain are not unarticulated differences but deep dis-
agreements (a possibility, in my view, with considerably more prom-
ise)? Second, is the secularity of the international human rights 
documents inherently opposed, as Ignatieff suggests, to those indi- 
 
 
 10. Ignatieff, supra note 1, at 60. 
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viduals and cultures with religious convictions?11 Is it, in other 
words, a secularity imbued with pessimism, a “lowest common de-
nominator[],” as he describes it, “enabling people to pretend to 
share more than they actually do,”12 or is it a secularity with more sa-
cred possibilities, a space where religious visions of human being are 
subjected to their truest, most universal measure?  
In addition to the endless rounds of voting and the diversity of 
countries represented in the UDHR’s final language, our knowledge 
of the Declaration’s drafting sessions suggests that the question of 
religion and human rights was posed repeatedly and vigorously dis-
cussed. 
The preparatory work of the Universal Declaration makes clear 
that no particular religion was to be deemed the foundation for hu-
man rights. For example, in drafting the Universal Declaration, the 
issue was raised as to whether to include some reference to a deity in 
the preamble and in Article 1, such that Article 1 would read that 
“human beings are created in the image of God . . . [and] are en-
dowed by nature with reason and conscience.” The drafters deliber-
ately rejected any references to a deity or to the immortal destiny of 
human beings so as not to impose the philosophical concepts of 
natural law (which derives from one particular religion) on countries 
to which it was alien and also not to impose it on nonbelievers.13 
Despite Ignatieff’s foreboding about the latent clashes at the 
heart of the Universal Declaration, he does imagine a secular defense 
of human rights to which human beings could universally appeal. 
What he describes as “moral reciprocity” is, he suggests, a nonreli-
gious, nonmetaphysical foundation capable of buoying contemporary 
human rights discourse. Moral reciprocity is grounded for Ignatieff 
in a kind of biologically based common sense. It is, as he says, the 
idea 
 
 11. At a recent discussion I attended on “religious leadership and human rights” at the 
1999 Parliament of the World’s Religions, held in Cape Town, South Africa, one of the panel-
ists spoke of the “paradox” of religious leaders resonating so strongly to a secular document 
like the Universal Declaration. It seems too often that the notion of “secularity” is seen to be 
somehow antithetical to religion. But what is paradoxical about religions finding themselves in 
the UDHR? 
 12. Ignatieff, supra note 1, at 58. 
 13. See Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty 
and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 271, 341 (1997). 
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that we cannot conceive of any circumstances in which we or any-
one we know would wish to be abused in mind or body. That 
we . . . possess the faculty of imagining the pain and degradation 
done to other human beings as if it were our own [] is simply a fact 
about us as a species. . . . Such [a] natural fact[ ] about human be-
ings provide[s] the grounds for an entitlement to protection . . . 
[and] right[s] . . . .14 
Whether we assume that the ability to imagine the suffering of 
others is simply a natural fact about the human species depends, of 
course, on what we mean by “natural.” Ignatieff clarifies his inten-
tions when he avers with some certainty that this “secular defense of 
human rights—based on practical historical experience and a mini-
malist anthropology—will necessarily leave religious thinkers unsatis-
fied.” How, we might well ask, do “religious thinkers” think? How 
do they argue? Too many, like Ignatieff, assume that “religious 
thinkers” or simply persons with particular faith convictions will be 
unable to enter into discussions about human being and human 
rights based on “practical historical experience” and “minimalist an-
thropology” alone. What is unsatisfying, I would argue, is not a con-
versation based on human history and experience but Ignatieff’s be-
lief that this excludes religion. In other words, what he calls a 
minimalist anthropology does not appear to me to be minimalist at 
all, and what he calls practical historical experience should not ex-
clude religious experiences. 
What I want to question is the notion that any anthropological 
or historical parsing of human experience could ever fully exclude 
the deeper questions and interpretations raised by religious and phi-
losophical visions of human being. More foundational for the human 
rights debate than any single “natural” human capacity is the cross-
cultural conversation about human being and its purposes. Ignatieff’s 
effort to stick to the “natural facts” does not stabilize this conversa-
tion but only inappropriately curtails it. 
A. The Word “Sacred” and its So-called Secular Co-option: Michael 
Perry 
On the other side of the river from Ignatieff’s attempted es-
chewal of metaphysics (through his appropriation and use of the 
term “natural fact”) are the efforts of legal scholar Michael Perry and 
 
 14. Ignatieff, supra note 1, at 60-61 (emphasis added). 
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others to reclaim human rights territory for “religious thinking.” 
Prominent in Perry’s work is his mission to clarify and strengthen the 
word “sacred” after its thinning and co-option at the hands of secu-
larists like Ronald Dworkin. In his recent book, The Idea of Human 
Rights, Perry takes up this project by asking rhetorically, “Is there 
any intelligible secular version of the claim that every human being is 
sacred—or, instead, is the claim inescapably religious and the idea of 
human rights, therefore, ineliminably religious?”15 
Perry begins, in other words, by recognizing the secular currency 
of the word “sacred” in the contemporary human rights debate and, 
particularly, how it has functioned for some secularists as a kind of 
grounding for human rights. If, so goes his logic, it can be argued 
that the word “sacred” necessarily belongs within a religious frame-
work (i.e., that there is no intelligible secular version of the claim 
that every human being is sacred), then he believes the argument will 
have been made for the “ineliminably religious” foundations of hu-
man rights. 
After an etymology of the word “religion” and a quotation about 
the human need for existential meaning by Albert Camus, Perry 
moves to an articulation of what he intends by the word “religious”: 
“To say that a conviction is ‘religious’ . . . is to say that the convic-
tion is embedded in a religious vision or cosmology, that it is an as-
pect, a constituent, of such a vision: a vision according to which the 
world is ultimately meaningful . . . .”16 
Thus, for Perry, “religious vision” appears to be tantamount to a 
vision that renders the world (and, presumably, one’s place therein) 
“ultimately meaningful.” But why exactly is an affirmation of life’s 
ultimate meaning necessarily “religious” and not simply an affirma-
tion that one is not depressed? On a common-sense level, we might 
join Perry in affirming that what makes the human being sacred and 
therefore worthy and in need of human rights has to do with the in-
dividual’s irreplaceability in a scheme where meaning (and, particu-
larly, the meaning of life) transcends an individual’s own immediate 
limits. And yet, Perry himself asks, “For persons who do not count 
themselves religious, what does it mean to say that every human be-
ing is sacred?”17 For Dworkin, as Perry understands him, a nonreli-
 
 15. MICHAEL PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 5 (1998). 
 16. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 17. Id. at 26-29. 
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gious account of human sacredness is based upon two intersecting 
grounds: namely, that the individual human being in its uniqueness 
is at once the highest product of natural creation and the highest 
product of human creative force.18 
For Perry, this account uses the term “sacred” in a subjective or 
weak sense that is ultimately not adequate to the work it must do: 
something is sacred because it inspires awe in us. Perry’s claim is that 
Dworkin fails to move us effectively toward an understanding of 
human sacredness in the strong, objective sense: namely, that some-
thing is sacred and therefore it inspires awe in us. How, he asks, can 
we move from an agnosticism about the universe’s ultimate meaning 
to an affirmation that every human being is nevertheless sacred? And 
yet this question is framed by assumptions about religion and nonre-
ligion that we have already queried, namely, Perry’s equating of 
secularity in human rights discourse with agnosticism about ultimate 
meaning. 
In other words, we might accept Perry’s assertion that human sa-
credness depends upon ultimate meaning without conceding that we 
are speaking “religiously” or without affirming a religious foundation 
for human rights based upon Perry’s particular definition of religious 
vision. By the same token, we might accept Perry’s linking of human 
sacredness to an affirmation of ultimate meaning without imbuing 
this sacred anthropology with any particular substantive metaphysical 
backdrop. There are, to put it otherwise, different ways of relating 
secularity, ultimate meaning, and religion than the way Perry relates 
these ideas: secularity, in particular, need not be antithetical to relig-
ion. 
Perry’s critique seems to have to do with a circularity he detects 
in Dworkin’s account. If the human being is sacred merely because it 
inspires us to call it such, then how shall this human sacredness be 
anchored apart from our potential inflation or watering down of this 
subjective appellation? In other words, on what firm foundation does 
Dworkin establish human sacredness such that human beings 
“count” in a vision that transcends our own subjective evaluations? 
Over a prevailing relativism, how can we affirm cross-culturally not 
only human rights but also the transcendent value of human beings 
that they are intended to ensure? 
 
 
 18. See id. at 26-27. 
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These concerns are important ones. We need to be able to articu-
late why cultural-political trumps like “Asian values” or even similar 
trumps attempted within the language of human rights are not ac-
ceptable. Perry belongs among those who reject postmodern declara-
tions of relativism and take up instead the more difficult constructive 
work of responding to these human rights challenges. And yet the 
stronger metaphysical foundation Perry seeks over Dworkin’s secular 
sacredness has a circularity of its own. To repeat, the strong, objec-
tive sense of sacredness that Perry asserts (and critiques Dworkin’s 
secular account for failing to reach) is the following: something is sa-
cred and therefore it inspires awe in us. 
In terms of linguistics and logic, we can appreciate the distinc-
tion between the “weak, subjective” and the “strong, objective” ac-
counts. And yet, when we consider claims to particular religious 
foundations or freedoms as trumps of other human rights (as when 
claims of religious human rights are placed in opposition to the hu-
man rights of women), what does Perry’s distinction (between weak 
and strong) offer methodologically or substantively that helps us to 
adjudicate this conflict? Is there any sense—legal or otherwise—in 
which strong, objective language about anthropology (some account 
of God’s relationship to human beings or some other kind of sacred 
anthropology) can appropriately triumph over so-called weak, sub-
jective language about human dignity? In other words, were we to 
grant Perry’s grounding of human sacredness in religious vision as he 
defines it, would this bring us to concede his related argument that 
human rights have a necessarily religious foundation? What tools 
would this affirmation provide for the larger debate over the rela-
tionship between religion (and religious human rights) and the 
growing end of human rights? What finally is gained if Perry has in-
deed taken us from Dworkin’s secular version of sacredness to one 
framed in an excessively inclusive religious vision? Is Perry’s ground-
ing in religious vision ultimately any stronger (more effective in 
cross-cultural dialogue) than Ignatieff’s allegedly metaphysics-free 
account of “moral reciprocity”?19 
 
 19. Richard Bernstein frames the constructive divides effectively: 
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B. The Quest for the “God-given and Reasonable”: Max Stackhouse 
Like Michael Perry, Christian ethicist Max Stackhouse seeks an 
anchor for human rights that might buoy them against claims (com-
ing, he points out, from the east and west) that rights are culturally 
specific and appropriate for those moored in the western philosophi-
cal tradition alone. He joins human rights critics in observing insta-
bility in philosophical thought, social analysis, and even moral judg-
ment as foundations for human rights, vulnerable as they all are to 
self-interests and improper rationalizations. The problem, as he 
frames it, is that these disciplines do not stand on their own and 
need therefore to be recognized as subject to a reality that transcends 
them. “[A]ll of the[se disciplines] need to be seen as subject to stan-
dards, purposes, and an unconditioned reality greater than our wis-
doms, systems, judgments, and religions can generate or discover 
alone. ‘Logos’ requires ‘Theos.’ Theology is required.”20 
Indeed, Stackhouse girds his argument for the necessity of theol-
ogy by considering the historical record of those who have eschewed 
its wisdom. 
[I]t is those movements that have repudiated theology that have 
been the source of the greatest destruction of our times, the great-
est violators of human rights. One might speak of Papa Doc’s 
Haiti, of Pol Pot’s Cambodia, of Marcos’s Philippines, of Mao’s 
China, of Stalin’s Soviet Union, and of dozens of petty tyrants in  
Latin America, and Africa—all of whom rejected theology in favor 
of “modern scientific” approaches to social reality.21 
The historical point loses its strength in the next sentence, how-
ever, where Stackhouse himself points out: “Of course, South Africa 
 
either some form of objectivism, foundationalism, ultimate grounding of knowl-
edge . . . or that we are ineluctably led to relativism, skepticism, historicism, and ni-
hilism. 
  . . . . 
The problem is not just an intellectual one . . . . At issue are some of the most per-
plexing questions concerning human beings: what we are, what we can know, what 
norms ought to bind us, what are the grounds for hope. 
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND REALISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, 
AND PRAXIS 2-4 (1983). 
 20. Max Stackhouse, Human Rights and Public Theology: The Basic Validation of Hu-
man Rights, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 12, 21 (Carrie Gustaf-
son & Peter Juviler eds., 1999) [hereinafter Stackhouse]. 
 21. Id. 
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and Iran would also have to be mentioned, but a thorough analysis is 
unlikely to find developments there to be genuinely theological, even 
if they were religious.”22 
What is this difference between theology and religion upon 
which Stackhouse is trading? What indeed is this distinction that he 
deems potent enough to explain away the doctrinal underpinnings of 
apartheid, as if they were merely “religious” and not worthy of the 
name “theology”? Theology, as he defines it, is that discipline “by 
which we analyze the comparative worth of various religious claims 
according to their capacity to offer a viable comprehending view of 
life and meaning for all.” It is, in other words, a discipline that, with 
its critically evaluative tools, presumably stands above the conflicts 
engendered in the name of “religion.” Thus, “even if much in every 
religion is identity-based and culturally particular, some theological—
that is, some God-given and reasonable—normative insights bind all 
humanity together.”23 Theology for Stackhouse is that universal 
which transcends all particular religious claims and the moil that so 
often accompanies them. 
And yet, when is theology ever in a position to evaluate religious 
systems according to whether they provide “a comprehending view 
of life and meaning for all”? In other words, what sort of theology 
would be at once so neutral and so informed as to stand above the 
fray of conflicting religious truths and effectively evaluate the heart of 
each particular religious system? Legal scholar and human rights ex-
pert Louis Henkin articulates the difficulty eloquently: “the world is 
not yet educated,” he suggests, “to Professor Stackhouse’s distinc-
tion between religion and theology, and it is likely to continue to 
judge ‘theology’ by what religion, or particular religions, profess and 
practice and preach.”24 
In addition to Professor Stackhouse’s distinction between theol-
ogy and religion is his relating of the terms “God-given” and “rea-
sonable.” What makes theology normative, Stackhouse suggests, is 
its ability to provide a universal rationality that transcends all fallible 
human arguments. As Stackhouse avers, “the ‘logos’ of ‘theos’ may 
well be the most rational ground for holding to human rights . . . . 
 
 22. Id. at 21. 
 23. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 24. Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Religious or Enlightened?, in RELIGION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 31, 33 (Carrie Gustafson & Peter Juviler eds., 1999). 
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Indeed, theological ideas are often the unacknowledged and indis-
pensable root of those non-religious universalist philosophies that 
also support human rights.”25 But what is the relationship between 
this rationality, this “logos of theos,” and the rationality upon which 
fallible human arguments are made? What is this logos that includes 
and founds—albeit unacknowledged—even secular arguments for 
human rights made by nonreligious philosophies? Stackhouse’s 
search for a normative basis for human rights that is somehow God-
given, theological, and reasonable seems in conflict with his own 
universalist definition of theology. If theology is indeed that practice 
“by which we [might] analyze the comparative worth of various reli-
gious claims,” then where is the allowance for the givenness of relig-
ion, be it God-given or otherwise? 
If, as Stackhouse seems to suggest, theology is engaged in a 
genuine exercise of practical reason, then it cannot stand above the 
fray. Theology cannot stand above and judge, cross-culturally, all 
penultimate religious claims and, at the same time, be “the most ra-
tional ground for holding to human rights,” an assumption that im-
plies the construction of human arguments and judgments (the as-
signation “most rational” will need to be acknowledged by a 
consensus of parties in the conversation of practical reason). 
Professor Stackhouse’s quest for a normative theology and uni-
versal rationality is in the end a quest for a higher ground and au-
thority than human despotism, self-interest, and failure. 
[E]ach person by virtue of being human must be accorded a dig-
nity and a respect that precludes violation of his or her person, rela-
tionships, and convictions. Still, further, because all peoples and cul-
tures stand under a universal “higher authority” that humans did not 
construct and cannot deconstruct, people may seek to change the 
unjust laws of various nations, the unjust conventions of any cul-
tures, or the unjust practices of any religion that permits or advo-
cates violation of that core . . . . 
[All of this] because some things are so sacred that no regime is 
competent to control their existence.26 
In this he joins all others in the transgenerational human rights 
community that have held out for the possibility that human rights 
 
 25. Stackhouse, supra note 20, at 16. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
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could triumph over the politics of rights violations. Some things are 
indeed so sacred as to transcend the control of all penultimate reli-
gious mandates and political regimes. And yet Stackhouse’s “higher 
authority” has brought us no nearer than Perry’s attempted retrieval 
of the objective sense of the word “sacred” or indeed than the  
human rights movement as a whole to a practical ability to separate 
this transcending sacredness from unjust religious and political prac-
tices. 
Stackhouse seeks a foundation for human rights talk that would 
at once transcend realpolitik and equip us to adjudicate among in-
creasing claims made in the name of “rights.” In the end, however, 
he asserts a kind of utopia, calling it alternately “theology,” “univer-
sal rationality,” and an “unconditioned reality greater than our wis-
doms” for which he can draw no map. We are instinctively aware of 
the ideals to which Stackhouse points, but we remain as ill-equipped 
as before for the journey to which his thinking beckons us: be it 
from religions to theology; from our conflicting wisdoms to a uni-
versal rationality; or from our political constructions to that “univer-
sal ‘higher authority’ that humans did not construct and cannot de-
construct.”27 
We have seen, on the one hand, a genuine concern for more 
deeply rooted foundations, the search for a measure on earth that 
would transcend the fray of religious and political conflicts and con-
tribute toward peace. For Michael Perry and Max Stackhouse, this 
foundation cannot be conceived apart from a religious or theological 
framework. And yet we have observed among other thinkers a dis-
comfort with any such foundation that would claim a universality in-
clusive of and appropriate for every particular way of being human. 
For Michael Ignatieff in particular, it is a “moral reciprocity” based 
on a minimalist anthropology and practical historical experience 
rather than any inclusive religious foundation that will ground our 
cross-cultural quest to strengthen human rights. 
We have heard in the larger human rights debate (of which this 
paper offers a mere sliver) positions that seek to avoid the religious 
or spiritual dimensions of human existence, assuming that they are 
too divisive and can somehow be successfully bypassed. We have 
heard also at the table the frustration of many religious believers that  
 
 
 27. Id. 
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secularist human rights defenders minimize the importance of reli-
gious and other belief-related human rights. Where do we go from 
here? 
III. BEYOND ARGUMENT: DAVID TRACY’S INQUIRY INTO VARIOUS 
INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD 
In the end, and at bottom, for the human rights movement, in-
sistence on the nontheistic foundations of the contemporary human 
rights idea reflects a quest for universal acceptance and universal 
commitment to a common moral intuition articulated in specific 
agreed-upon terms. The Universal Declaration is not antireligious; it 
is not even nonreligious. It is—many believe—a magnificent articula-
tion of our common morality and an essential support for religion, 
for religions, for humankind, in the troubled hopeful world of the 
new millennium.28 
We recall from this paper’s beginning David Tracy’s reminder of 
the fragility of the present-day human rights movement and his call 
for “reasons . . . forthcoming to affirm its grounds.”29 What role, we 
now ask, will religious thinking play, if any, in this work? What form 
will these reasons take and in what forums will they be debated? Fi-
nally, if human rights has become a kind of international civil relig-
ion, how deep will its foundations need to go? In the pages remain-
ing, I would like to sketch briefly some of the constructive 
possibilities Tracy presents and point to at least one concrete exam-
ple where I see Tracy’s line of thinking put into practice. 
Tracy begins with the question of what is to count as public. 
Publicness in a pluralistic culture, be it of a single society or the 
cross-cultural culture of the human rights movement, requires rea-
soned argument and discussion among the culture’s participants. 
“To provide reasons is to render one’s claims shareable and pub-
lic . . . [and] to be willing to engage in argument. Argument is the 
most obvious form of public discourse.”30 Second (and it is impor-
tant not to read this as relativism), truth in this public realm is neces-
 
 28. See Louis Henkin, Religion, Religions, and Human Rights, 26.2 J. RELIGIOUS 
ETHICS 229, 234 (1998). 
 29. Tracy, supra note 2, at 247. 
 30. David Tracy, Human Cloning and the Public Realm: A Defense of Intuitions of the 
Good, in CLONES AND CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 194 (Mar-
tha C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998) [hereinafter Human Cloning]. 
HOL-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  9:42 PM 
867] Sacred Possibilities for the Secular Discourse 
 881 
sarily a truth of consensus—a consensus, as Tracy frames it, “of the 
community of inquiry cognizant of and guided by the criteria and 
evidence of whatever the particular subject matter under discussion 
demands.”31 
Public consensus in this vision is no mere intersection or over-
lapping of self-interests but the imperfect product of an ongoing 
commitment to debate, inquiry, and deliberation about matters of 
common concern. In simple terms, public consensus in Tracy’s view 
is made possible when a living community of inquiry engages in a 
debate where no argument enters with privileged status and all are 
subject to the equal burden to persuade. This, as we know, is not 
necessarily a harmonious process, nor is it always an unbiased one, 
but, in this public realm, disagreement is itself to be valued as a sign 
of publicness and true exchange, and it neither necessitates nor per-
mits violence. 
If, for Tracy, reason is the prime candidate for publicness, he 
nevertheless concedes the limits of argument and finds at argument’s 
edge a second candidate for publicness, as necessary as, but distinct 
from, the first, namely, “an inquiry into various intuitions of the 
good, including those expressed in art and religion.”32 What is at 
stake here is not how much room the “public” arena makes for the 
“private” religious and philosophical visions of individuals and com-
munities. At stake and in crisis in this delimitation of public and pri-
vate is the very life of the public arena itself. When the international 
public relies upon argument alone and uses as this argument’s foun-
dation only a technical or instrumental reason (where, for example, 
rights are discussed procedurally but not the goods these rights are 
intended to secure), then publicness itself is in danger. 
Indeed, Tracy suggests that the current tensions and impasses 
about the relationship between religion and human rights reveal the 
overly narrow and positivist understanding of reason prevalent today. 
This in view, Tracy suggests that finding a place for religious con-
cepts in public dialogue and inquiry about human rights (or any 
other matter of our common life) is a project intimately and logically 
related to expanding our sense of what is public and our understand-
ing of human reason as a whole. When religious and philosophical 
intuitions are excluded from the cross-cultural conversation about 
 
 31. Id. at 194-95. 
 32. Id. at 195. 
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human rights, then this conversation and its ability to promote hu-
man goods is impoverished. 
What then do religious intuitions of the good look like, and how 
do they relate to human rights? Tracy sees disclosive paradigms and 
symbols in (among many other discourses) the Jewish tradition on 
the importance of embodiment, the Catholic social justice tradition 
on relationality among human beings, as well as Buddhist traditions 
on our relationships to nonhuman creatures. And yet despite the in-
sights into the good that religious resources can point to, Tracy does 
not suggest that religious visions should be eligible for the public 
realm based upon their inherent goodness. Indeed, what he calls the 
“ethical and cognitive ambiguity” of religion is for him yet another 
reason why religious disclosures must be accessible to the public 
realm. “[T]his cognitive and ethical ambiguity of religion, with its 
disclosure of the true and false, the good and the evil . . . should be 
sufficient evidence to warrant the belief that religions are crucial 
phenomena for all in the public realm to risk interpreting.”33 
The reality that brings Tracy to affirm the role of religion in the 
human rights debate is the need for a methodology other than the 
tolerance of retreat. To put it simply: we as citizens and human be-
ings, as believers and nonbelievers, need to learn civility, how to 
speak to and disagree with one another. We need room beyond but 
related to the human rights grammar for describing our various and 
sometimes conflicting ideas about human being, its limits, and what 
transcends it. Without these cross-cultural efforts, be they local, na-
tional or international, we will have no community of inquiry and 
only “Fish’s first law of tolerance dynamics” where “tolerance . . . is 
exercised in an inverse proportion to there being anything at 
stake.”34 
As Tracy names the crisis and the hope: 
unless we learn to converse better and argue more clearly with one 
another on how to provide better descriptions of and reflection 
upon our distinct visions of the human good, we are all in danger 
of allowing the promise of cultural and religious pluralism to slide 
into a kind of Will Rogers pluralism one where you never met an 
 
 33. Id. at 197. 
 34. David Little, Tolerance, Equal Freedom, and Peace, in THE ESSENCE OF LIVING IN A 
FREE SOCIETY 153, 157 (W. Lawson Taitte ed., 1997) (quoting STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO 
SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 217). 
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opinion you didn’t like. Any responsible pluralist has met  
unacceptable opinions and intuitions and, when pressed, should be 
able to state clearly just why this opinion is wrong.35 
IV. “TO SPEAK AND BE HEARD”: THE PARK RIDGE CENTER FOR 
HEALTH, FAITH, AND ETHICS 
In 1994, Cairo, Egypt, was host to the United Nations’ Interna-
tional Conference on Population and Development. At the confer-
ence, U.N. member nations and nongovernmental organizations 
convened to find solutions for and take action with respect to prob-
lems of reproductive health and population stabilization. If the con-
flict that erupted there between religious and secular leaders was sur-
prising to some, perhaps it should not have been. For the conference 
agenda implied assumptions about some of the most hotly contested 
topics of our day, from the nature of the family to gender and 
sexuality. What pluralistic forum could hope to take up these issues 
without clash? 
At Cairo, and later at the Beijing Conference on Women, relig-
ion appeared to many, and particularly to many in the press, as divi-
sive and the enemy of progress in matters of human rights and de-
velopment. The question that emerged from the Cairo events for the 
Park Ridge Center was this: How can believers, drawing upon both 
their reason and the internal resources of their respective traditions, 
“consistently advance . . . understanding and make progress in deal-
ing with profound issues of the sort that surfaced at Cairo?”36 
The multiphased, six-year project that this question inspired, “To 
Speak and Be Heard,” began with a gathering of nineteen people, 
most of whom had been participants or close observers at the U.N. 
Cairo Conference. Coming from seven world religious communities 
(the Baha’i faith, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, 
and the Native American traditions) and spanning the political spec-
trum from liberal to conservative, they were interviewed about the 
place of religion in public policy debates. How, they were asked, 
could the internal resources of their respective traditions inform 
these cross-cultural discussions? Should faith traditions and people of 
faith be participants at local, national, and international forums 
 
 35. Human Cloning, supra note 30, at 197. 
 36. Martin E. Marty et al., Principles of Religious Civil Discourse (visited Mar. 24, 2000) 
<http://www.prchfe.org/publications-special-handbooks-rpd.html>. 
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where matters of public import are at stake? And what kind of rules 
might facilitate effective and serious public conversation involving 
people of faith?37 
The immediate product of these interviews was a handbook of 
guidelines, one set for religious participants and one for policymak-
ers, for use in religious and otherwise pluralist conversations about 
matters of common care. The less tangible but no less vital product 
of these interviews is, I would suggest, a contribution to the rein-
vigoration of publicness. We recall Michael Ignatieff’s words about a 
moral reciprocity based upon a minimalist anthropology and practi-
cal historical experience that would necessarily leave religious think-
ers unsatisfied. On the other side of the debate we recall Max Stack-
house’s call for the normativity of the “God-given and reasonable” 
beyond all proposals, practices, and claims of particular religions. 
What is constructively achieved by the “religious thinking” of 
David Tracy, as well as the pragmatic work of projects like the Park 
Ridge Center’s “To Speak and Be Heard,” is an enrichment of pub-
lic reason and an expansion of its participants. Both Tracy and Park 
Ridge, in their own ways, transcend the public/private, reli-
gious/secular dualisms that thwart Ignatieff’s and Stackhouse’s re-
spective quests for normativity. Now the intuitions of faith traditions 
stand alongside other insights of human experience in the discussions 
of the human condition and human history at the heart of the hu-
man rights debate. Now a place is made for intuitions of the good, 
religious and otherwise, without setting them up as contestants in a 
process that will ultimately eliminate them. 
This call to religious and philosophical inquiry at the limits of 
human argument is by no means the “answer” to the “question” of 
human rights promotion. Instead, it is almost a kind of common- 
sense suggestion, albeit one that must ultimately take up the com-
plexities of both religion and human rights. As Tracy puts it: 
[I]f we are to find out if we share any basic values (visions of the 
good) at all about what is human about a human being, the relig-
ions can and should be viewed as traditions of great and subtle 
complexity on these very issues and, at their best, as ancient and 
highly developed depositories of rare wisdom for any open-minded 
inquirer.38 
 
 37. See id. 
 38. Human Cloning, supra note 30, at 199. 
